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Abstract
We construct a dynamic, stochastic rational expectations model of
labor reallocation that is designed so that its key parameters can be
estimated for trade policy analysis. A key feature is the presence of
time-varying idiosyncratic moving costs faced by workers. As a conse-
quence of these shocks: (i) gross flows exceed net flows (an important
feature of empirical labor movements); (ii) the economy features gradual
and anticipatory adjustment to aggregate shocks; (iii) wage diﬀerentials
across locations or industries can persist in the steady state; and (iv)
the normative implications of policy can be very diﬀerent from a model
without idiosyncratic shocks, even when the aggregate behavior of both
models is similar. It is shown that the solution to a particular planner’s
problem yields a competitive equilibrium, thus facilitating the analysis
and simulation of the model for policy purposes.
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1. Introduction.
The eﬀect of a given change in trade policy is greatly aﬀected by the costs workers
may face in adjusting to it. This is especially true of the distributional eﬀects of
the change, but it extends also to the eﬃciency eﬀects. For example, the eﬀects of
opening up a sector of the economy previously protected from import competition
depend crucially on how easily the workers in that sector can Þnd employment
in other sectors. If geographic or sectoral mobility costs are high, the eﬃciency
beneÞts are thereby reduced and the burden borne by those workers is increased.
Analysis of the eﬀect of trade on wages thus always requires the use of some
assumption on the degree of labor mobility.2 Further, the eﬀects of immigration
into a particular region of the country depend on how ßuid labor is between that
region and others, sand so the literature on labor-market eﬀects of immigration
has always required assumptions on the degree of mobility (see Borjas et. al.
(1996), Slaughter and Scheve (1999)).3
The cost of labor reallocation is also a central issue driving the political econ-
omy of trade policy, as emphasized for example in static approaches by Magee
(1989) and Irwin (1996), and in dynamic analyses of endogenous trade policy
such as Staiger and Tabellini (1999) and McLaren (1997, 2002).
This paper proposes a workhorse model of equilibrium labor reallocation that
is designed to address these policy questions head-on. It incorporates a number
of features that are intended to make the model helpful in analyzing trade policy
changes in particular, and to be consistent with the broad empirical features of
the adjustment process. It also has the beneÞt that its parameters can be esti-
mated econometrically, thus providing for more detailed policy analysis through
simulation, a project which is being carried on in parallel with the theoretical
exercise detailed here.
The model is an inÞnite-horizon dynamic stochastic model with rational ex-
pectations, in which from time to time random shocks may hit labor demand
2For example, speciÞc-factors models and the Stolper-Samuelson approach have very diﬀerent
implications for the relationship between trade and wages, driven entirely by diﬀerent assump-
tions about mobility costs; and the appropriate time horizon for measuring the labor-market
eﬀects of trade also depends on assumptions about mobility costs. See Slaughter (1998) for an
extended discussion.
3For example, the diﬀerences between the Hecksher-Ohlin approach, the factor-proportions
analysis approach, and the area analysis approach to the eﬀects of immigration (Borjas et.
al., 1996) are entirely driven by diﬀerent assumptions about labor mobility. See Slaughter and
Scheve (1999) for an extensive discussion.
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either in a sector or in a region of the country (for example, changes in trade
policy or terms-of-trade shocks). In response to these shocks, each worker at each
moment may choose whether to remain where she is or to move to another sector
or geographic location. If the worker moves, she will pay a cost that has two
components: A portion that is the same for all workers making the same move,
which is a parameter of the model and is publicly known; and a time-varying
idiosyncratic portion. The latter is an extremely important feature of the model,
because it generates all of the models dynamics and allows for gross ßows to
exceed net ßows. If individual situations can vary, one may Þnd large numbers
of workers moving in opposite directions at the same time, and this is indeed a
prominent feature of the equilibrium of the model. This is important because
empirically gross ßows of workers across geographical locations and industries are
substantially larger than net ßows.
Many authors have proposed theoretical models of the dynamics of factor
reallocation in response to a trade or policy shock (a number of the issues are
reviewed in Neary (1985)). Mussa (1978, 1982) studies the dynamics of adjustment
in a trade model, with capital as a quasi-Þxed factor bearing convex adjustment
costs. In both models, labor is either completely immobile (that is, labor faces
inÞnite moving costs) or costlessly mobile (faces zero moving costs). The roles of
capital and labor could easily be reversed to consider labor adjustment dynamics.
Dixit (1993) studies a similar model with random trade shocks and a Þxed cost to
each reallocation, and Dixit and Rob (1994) consider Þxed labor-adjustment costs
in a model with random labor-demand shocks and risk-averse workers. Rappaport
(2000) and Dehejia (1997) study models with strictly convex reallocation costs for
labor. Matsuyama (1992) studies a model whose workers cannot reallocate once
they have chosen a sector, so the dynamic adjustment to a trade shock comes
entirely through new labor market entrants.
Finally, two important papers are particularly closely related to the model used
here. Jovanovic and Moﬃt (1990) oﬀer an approach based on a matching model,
in which workers disappointed in the job-match with their employers search for a
better match, and in each period some fraction of them move across sectors to do
so. Topel (1986) studies the dynamics of geographic reallocation of labor using
an equilibrium overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic moving costs.
Our theoretical model diﬀers from all of the above approaches in two ways.
First, we allows gross ßows to exceed net ßows, which is important given the em-
pirical importance of gross ßows highlighted above. Jovanovic and Moﬃt (1990)
shares this feature, but the other studies mentioned above do not. For this rea-
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son, idiosyncratic shocks are a key feature of our model. Unlike Jovanovic and
Moﬃt (1990), we allow for such shocks to be non-pecuniary in nature (such as
job dissatisfaction or personal constraints on geographic location).4 Topel (1986)
allows for idiosyncratic moving costs, but constrains gross interregional ßows to
be equal to net ßows.5
Second, our model has been tailor-made to allow for estimation of the moving-
cost parameters, a feature shared by none of the other equilibrium models.
In examining the model, we Þrst study a particular (distorted) planners prob-
lem in some detail, because it turns out that the planners solution is also a market
equilibrium. This provides a number of results on the market equilibrium that
would be very diﬃcult to derive by other means. The key properties include
gradual adjustment of the economy to an external shock; anticipatory adjustment
of the economy to an anticipated shock; and persistent wage diﬀerentials (across
sectors or regions of the economy) even in the long-run steady state, for reasons
that appear to be novel in the literature. In addition, we discuss a thought ex-
periment that demonstrates the importance of idiosyncratic costs for empirical
work, even at the aggregate level: We show that if the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks is suﬃciently high, the aggregate behaviour of the model will mimic a
model with no labor mobility, even though in fact mobility will be high and the
normative features of the equilibrium will be very diﬀerent from that of a model
with no mobility. This highlights the importance of second moments of moving
costs (such as the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks) as well as the Þrst mo-
ment, and points out an advantage of our structural approach over reduced-form
econometric approaches.
The following section lays out the structure of the model. The subsequent
section analyzes the solution to the planners problem of the optimal rule for the
allocation of labor, and Þnds the key Euler condition that characterizes optimal-
ity. The subsequent section shows that this optimal rule is implemented by the
decentralized rational expectations equilibrium. The following section elaborates
the most important properties of the equilibrium. Finally, we brießy discuss a
special case of the model that oﬀers a simple form for the equilibrium, facilitating
empirical estimation.
4In a sense, this actually Þts their data better than their own model, since they Þnd that
movers on average experience a loss in wages, which is the opposite of what one would expect
if the point of moving was to Þnd a higher wage.
5In addition, Topel (1986) requires the number of regions to be large so that asymptotic
properties can be used to solve the equilibrium. Our model requires no such assumption.
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2. The model.
Consider a model in which production may occur in any of n cells, where a cell
is taken to mean a particular industry in a particular place. For example, phar-
maceuticals in New Jersey might be one of the cells, as might pharmaceuticals
in Delaware or food service in New Jersey. In each cell there are a large number
of competitive employers, and the value of their aggregate output in any period
t is given by xit = X
i(Lit, st) ≥ 0, where Lit denotes the labor used in cell i in
period t, and st is a state variable that could capture the eﬀects of policy (such as
trade protection, which might raise the domestic price of the output), technology
shocks, changes in world prices, and the like. Assume that s follows a Þrst-order
Markov process on some compact state space Ss ⊂ <k for some k, where the
probability distribution for st+1 conditional on st is given by a continuous density
function h(st+1; st).
Assume that Xi is strictly increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable and concave
in its Þrst argument, and also continuous in its second argument. Its Þrst deriva-
tive with respect to labor, denoted X i1, is then a continuous, decreasing function
of labor. We will assume that the price received by producers in a cell does not
depend on the quantity produced in that cell,6 so that Xi1 is the value marginal
product of labor and thus the demand curve for labor in the cell.7 Denote the




The economys workers form a continuum of measure L. Each worker at any
moment is located in one of the n cells. Denote the number of workers in cell i at
the beginning of period t by Lit, and the allocation of workers by Lt = [L
1
t , . . . , L
n
t ].
If a worker, say, θ ∈ [0, L], is in cell i at the beginning of t, she will produce in
that cell, collect the market wage wit for that cell, and then may move to any
other cell.
If a worker moves from cell i to cell j, she incurs a cost Cij ≥ 0, which is the
same for all workers and all periods, and is publicly known. This can include,
6For example, this would hold in the case of a small open economy in which the only trade
impediments are tariﬀs, so that the domestic price of each good is equal to an exogenous world
price plus a tariﬀ rate. Another example would be if each location is small relative to the rest
of the economy, each good is produced in a large number of locations within the country, and
the market for each good is nationally integrated.
7This matters only for the property that the equilibrium can be represented as a distorted
planners optimum, which is useful for computation and for proof of some properties. The
endogeneity of product prices is irrelevant for the market equilibrium conditions derived in
Section 4 and for the estimation strategy outlined in Section 6.
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for example, moving costs, if i and j are in diﬀerent locations; training costs
(tuition and time required for sector-speciÞc schooling, for example) if i and j
are in diﬀerent industries; and a myriad of psychic costs as well that come from
leaving a familiar location or occupation and moving to a new one. For example,
in an economy with two sectors (textiles (T) and shoes (S)) and two regions (East
(E) and West (W)), suppose that cells 1, 2, 3, and 4 are T-E (textiles-East),
T-W, S-E and S-W respectively. In that case, C12, C21, C34, and C43 are costs
of moving between the regions, which include moving company services, realtors
fees, search costs for a new house, and the like. On the other hand, C13 and C24
are costs of moving out of the textile business and acquiring the human capital
required to be an eﬀective worker in the shoe business, which could involve night
school or the time cost of making the right network connections for the new line
of work.
In addition, if she is in cell i at the end of period t, the worker collects an
idiosyncratic beneÞt εiθ,t from being in that cell. These beneÞts are independently
and identically distributed across individuals, cells, and dates, with density and
cumulative distribution function f and F : < 7−→ <+ respectively, where f(ε) >
0∀ε. We normalize the average value R εf(ε)dε of the εs to zero. One can
think of these beneÞts as capturing anything in ones personal situation that may
aﬀect the direction or timing of labor market decisions independently of wages.
For example, in the example of the previous paragraph, a worker in T-E may
become terribly bored of the textile business and long for a change. This would
correspond to a low value for ε1 and ε2. On the other hand, this person may fall in
love with someone who lives in West, inducing high values for ε2 and ε4. Finally,
the workers family may have a member who is at the moment under the care of
a trusted local doctor, or the children may be near the end of high school, and at
the same time the worker has developed a good working rapport with her current
employer. In that case, any move would be costly, and we have low values for ε2,
ε3, and ε4.
Thus, the full cost for worker θ of moving from i to j can be thought of as
εiθ,t−εjθ,t+Cij, the Þrst two terms representing the idiosyncratic cost, and the last
term the common cost. Note that the idiosyncratic cost can be negative, which
is important, because that provides for gross labor ßows in excess of net ßows.
Adopt the convention that Cii = 0 for all i.
All agents have rational expectations and a common constant discount fac-
tor β < 1, and are risk neutral. Finally, we make the following boundedness
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assumption: Z
εF n−1(ε)f(ε)dε <∞. (2.1)
This states that the expected value of the maximum ε for any worker on any
date is Þnite.
3. The planners problem.
It is useful to examine a hypothetical social planners solution to the problem of
allocating workers to cells in this framework. Note that we mean social planner in
a narrow sense. For example, it has already been made clear that the state variable
s can include policy variables such as trade barriers, and these will all be treated
as exogenous. Given this qualiÞcation, the social planner chooses an allocation
rule, which can be summarized as a set of functionsDij : (<n×<n×Ss) 7−→ [0, 1],
with the interpretation that Dij(ε;L, s) is the fraction of workers in cell i with




Dij(ε;L, s) = 1∀i ∈ {1, . . . n}, ε, L ∈ <n, and s ∈ Ss. (3.1)




































with L0 and s0 given, with respect to the functions Dij. The Þrst term in the
square brackets of the objective function is simply the value of the output in cell
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i, and the second term is the aggregate of idiosyncratic beneÞts εj, contingent on
location decisions, and net of non-idiosyncratic moving costs Cij. The constraint
is simply the law of motion for the stock of workers in each cell: Lit+1 equals the
measure of period t cell i workers who remain there to period t+1, plus aggregate
arrivals to i from other cells.
It will be convenient to denote bymijt the fraction of workers in cell i who move
to j in period t. Of course, this is equal to
R ··· R Dij(ε;Lt, st)Qnk=1(f(εk)dεk).
Given the full support assumption made for the εs, it will be clear that it will be
optimal to have mijt > 0∀i, j, and t.
It is easy to demonstrate that an optimal allocation rule will always take a
particular form. First, for any pair of cells, i and j, at each date and state, there
is always a threshold, εij, such that no worker in i moves to j if her realization of
εi− εjis greater than εij, and no worker in i remains in i if her εi− εj is less than
εij. Thus, εij may be interpreted as the marginal idiosyncratic moving cost for
a mover from i to j. (Not surprisingly, later it will be seen that for an optimal
allocation rule, εij must also equal the marginal beneÞt to having one more worker
moved from i to j, and thus it will reßect all available information about future
labor demand in the two cells as well as the common moving costs, the Cijs.)
Proposition 3.1. Consider an optimal allocation rule {Dij}i,j∈{1,...n}. Fix i, j 6=




t > 0. For any number eε,
deÞne:
























(In other words, for any number eε, χ(eε) is the fraction of i workers who have
εi−εj > eε and move to j; and ξ(eε) is the fraction of i workers who have εi−εj < eε
and remain in i.) Then there exists εij such that χ(εij) = ξ(εij) = 0 .
We will adopt the convention that εii = 0∀i, and will denote the matrix of
these thresholds as ε ≡ {εij}i,j∈(1,...n). An important note is that εi−εj < εij does
not ensure that the worker goes to j, because it is possible that she will choose
a third option. That point is clariÞed by the following proposition, which shows
how all of the εij together fully determine the choices of each worker (to within a
set of measure zero).
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Proposition 3.2. Let the conditions in the previous proposition hold, and sup-
pose that we have chosen a set of εij as described there. Then Dij(ε;Lt, st) = 1




(except possibly on a set of measure zero). Equivalently, Dij(ε;Lt, st) = 0 if and
only if j does not maximize {εk + εik}, except possibly on a set of measure zero.
This allows us to write the planners problem in a simple way, as the choice
of a function ε(L, s) giving the thresholds at each date and state. The realized
current-period payoﬀ to a given worker in cell i is equal to that workers wage,
wit, plus (ε
j −Cij), if that worker moves to cell j. Conditional on the εiks and on
εj, the probability that this worker does move to cell j is
Q
k 6=j F (ε
j + εij − εik).




βtU(Lt, st, ε(Lt, st)), (3.3)
where
























F (εj + εij − εik)dεj, (3.5)
where εi = (εi1, . . . , εin). We can write mi(εi) = (mi1(εi), . . .min(εi)). This










where m denotes the full matrix of gross ßows and a prime on a vector indicates
the transpose.
The planner, then, maximizes (3.3) subject to (3.7), given L0 and s0.
Equation (3.5) deÞnes all gross ßows out of cell i as a function of εi, with
domain {εi : εij ∈ <, εii = 0} and range {mi : mij > 0,Pjmij = 1}. The
following presents a useful property of this function.
Proposition 3.3. For any i, the function mi is invertible.
Thus, we can meaningfully write either the gross ßows as a function of the εijs
(that is, mij(εij)) or vice versa (εij(mij)) without ambiguity. This result is useful
partly because it is helpful in deriving the planners Þrst order condition. In
addition, note that although the εijs are useful from the point of view of theory,
they are of course unobservable to an econometrician. However, in some cases
the gross ßows mij themselves are observable in conventional labor force surveys.
This theorem gives us a way of inferring the values of the unobservable εijs by
studying the observable mijs. This is a key to the econometric estimation of the
model.
3.1. The planners Þrst order condition.
It is clear that the optimization problem presented above can be represented as a
stationary dynamic programming problem, with Bellman equation:
V (L, s) = max
ε
{U(L, s, ε) + βEes[V (eL, es)|s]}, (3.8)
where V : <n×Ss 7→ < is the value function,8 eL and es are the next-period values
of the labor allocation vector L and the state s, with eL calculated from L and ε
by (3.7), and where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution ofes, conditional on s. Standard properties of dynamic programming problems will
hold here; for example, the value function will be diﬀerentiable in L.9 In addition:
8Of course, values for L in the solution will range only within the set {L ∈ <n|Li ≥ 0;Pi Li =
L}. It is useful, nonetheless, to deÞne the optimization problem for all L ∈ <n; for example,
this makes the partial derivaties Vi, i = 1, . . . n meaningful.
9It is straightforward to verify that the conditions of Theorem 9.10 of Lucas and Stokey
(1989, p. 266) are satisÞed. Technically, to apply that theorem, we need to restrict the domain
for L to a bounded set such as SL(L∗) ≡ {L ∈ <n|Li ≥ 0;Pi Li ∈ [0, L∗]} for some L∗ > L, to





Proposition 3.4. The value function is (i) non-negative; (ii) uniformly bounded
on any compact subset of the domain; and (iii) concave in L.
The Þrst order condition with respect to the εij terms can be obtained me-
chanically, and rearranged to yield the following.
Proposition 3.5. In an optimal allocation, the condition:






will hold at all times.
To interpret this condition, recall that εij denotes the value of εi − εj for
the marginal mover from i to j, and is thus the marginal idiosyncratic cost of
reallocating a worker from i to j. The left hand side of the equation is therefore
the marginal cost of moving workers from cell i to cell j. The right hand side is
the discounted marginal value of doing so.
In order to shed more light on the right-hand side of this condition, the enve-
lope condition can be applied to the Bellman equation, yielding the following.

















F (εj + εij − εik)dεj. (3.11)
This equation has a natural interpretation. An increase in the number of work-
ers in cell i has three eﬀects. The Þrst is the direct eﬀect of increased production
in cell i. The last is the beneÞt those workers generate in cell i if that is where they
remain. The middle term, which is simply the average value of maxj{εj + εijt }
for all workers currently in cell i, is the additional beneÞt owing to the ability to
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reallocate these workers into other cells. The Ω function is thus a measure of the
option value resulting from the ability to move workers from one cell to another.


















which, then, using (3.9) again, can be rewritten in the useful form as follows.






t+1, st+1)−Xi1(Lit+1, st+1) + Ω(εjt+1)− Ω(εit+1) + εijt+1 + Cij
¢
(3.13)
will hold at all times for all i 6= j.
This is the key condition for characterizing the optimal dynamic allocation
of workers, and also for estimating the model econometrically. The economic
meaning of this condition is fairly straightforward. Recall that the left-hand side
of the equation is the marginal cost of moving workers from cell i to cell j at time
t. The right-hand side is the marginal beneÞt of such a reallocation. As indicated
in (3.9), that marginal beneÞt is equal to the diﬀerence in the expected discounted
marginal value of a worker in the two cells next period. As indicated in (3.10),
that diﬀerence has three parts: The direct eﬀect of the diﬀerence in marginal
value products in the two cells, the continuation value of leaving the reallocated
workers in the new cell next period, and the additional value that comes from
exercising the option of reallocating some portion of them next period. The direct
eﬀect is indicated by the Þrst two terms on the right hand side of (3.13), and
the diﬀerence in option values is indicated by the following two terms. The
diﬀerence in continuation values is indicated by the Þnal two terms, which are
simply the marginal cost of moving a worker from i to j next period, which by
next periods Þrst order condition (3.9) must be equal to the diﬀerence in the




Here we show that the optimal allocation rule analyzed above is also the equi-
librium of a decentralized economy. Assume that all workers and employers take
wages as given. In each cell i at each date t, the wage wit will adjust to clear the




t, st) at all times. Assume that any worker who chooses
to move from i to j will herself bear both the common moving cost, Cij, and the
idiosyncratic moving costs, εi − εj. All agents have rational expectations and a
common constant discount factor β < 1, and are risk neutral.
An equilibrium then takes the form of a decision rule by which, in each period,
each worker will decide whether to stay in her cell or move to another, based on
the current allocation vector L of labor across sectors, the current aggregate state
s, and that workers own vector ε of shocks. In the aggregate, this decision rule
generates a law of motion for the evolution of labor allocation and, by the labor
market clearing condition just mentioned, for the wage in each sector. Given this
behaviour for wages, the decision rule must be optimal for each worker, in the sense
of maximizing her expected present discounted value of wages plus idiosyncratic
beneÞts net of moving costs.
Let the maximized value to each worker of being in sector i when the labor
allocation is L and the state is s be denoted by bυi(L, s, ε), which, of course,
depends on the workers realized idiosyncratic shocks. Denote by υi(L, s) the
average of bυi(L, s, ε) across all workers in i, or in other words, the expectation
of bυi(L, s, ε) with respect to the vector ε. Thus, υi(L, s) can also be interpreted
as the expected value of being in cell i, conditional on L and s, but before the
worker learns her value of ε. In contrast to the previous section, deÞne εijt by:
εijt ≡ βEt[υj(Lt+1, st+1)− υi(Lt+1, st+1)]− Cij. (4.1)
We can think of this deÞnition of εijt as indicating the common net beneÞt to
moving from cell i to cell j, which each i worker will then weigh against the
idiosyncratic costs of moving. This deÞnition of εijt will be seen to be equivalent
to the deÞnition of the previous section.
We can write a typical i-workers optimization problem as follows:
bυi(Lt, st, εt) = wit +max
j
{εjt − Cij + βEt[υj(Lt+1, st+1)]}
= wit + βEt[υ
i(Lt+1, st+1)] + max
j
{εjt + εijt }. (4.2)
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Taking the expectation of (4.2) with respect to the ε vector then yields the
i-workers Bellman equation:
υi(Lt, st) = w
i
t + βEt[υ
i(Lt+1, st+1)] + Ω(ε
i
t), (4.3)
where Ω is as deÞned in (3.11). Using (4.3), we can rewrite (4.1) as:
Cij + εijt = βEt[υ
j(Lt+1, st+1)− υi(Lt+1, st+1)]
= βEt[w
j




t+1 − wit+1 + Cij + εijt+1 + Ω(εjt+1)− Ω(εit+1)] (4.4)
Now we can verify that the allocation rule that solves the planners problem
is an equilibrium. First, for every t, Lt, and st, set vi(Lt, st) equal to
∂V (Lt,st)
∂Lit
from the solution to the planners problem. Then, at every state and date, the
εijt matrix deÞned by (4.1) is the same as that induced by the solution to the
planners problem, as shown by (3.9). Further, from (3.10), together with the
labor market clearing condition that the wage in each cell will be equal to the
marginal value product of labor, it is clear that the vi functions constructed in
this way satisfy the workers Bellman equation (4.3). Of course, then (3.13), the
condition that characterizes the planners optimum, is equivalent to (4.4), which
is the equilibrium condition characterizing the decentralized equilibrium. Thus,
the rule that solves the planners problem also describes a market equilibrium.
Henceforth, we can refer to the planners optimum and the equilibrium inter-
changeably. Since the planners problem is well-behaved, we thus have a proof of
the existence of competitive equilibrium and a method for computing it as well.
Two remarks on this are called for. First, this is an optimum allocation in
an extremely restricted sense. In particular, it should be pointed out once again
that the optimization problem analyzed here takes trade policy (for example) as
given, and looks only at the allocation of workers conditional on it. In addition,
the objective function set up in the previous section did not make any allowance
at all for distributional values. However, a large part of the interest in this prob-
lem springs from distribution values in practice; the point is, precisely, to analyze
who the gainers and losers will be from a given change in trade policy, for exam-
ple, and how badly the latter will be hurt. Thus, the actual objective function
for policy analysis will generally be diﬀerent from that studied above. Second,
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Dixit and Rob (1994) have pointed out that in the presence of risk aversion and
missing insurance markets, the market equilibrium of a labor adjustment process
with rational expectations will not generally be even constrained eﬃcient. Those
elements have not been incorporated into this model, but it would be of interest
to incorporate them into a later version.
The point of the equivalence of the optimal rule and the decentralized equilib-
rium is not to make an argument for nonintervention in the adjustment process,
but to facilitate more convenient computation and analysis of the decentralized
equilibrium. We now turn to that task.
5. Properties of the equilibrium.
A number of key properties of the adjustment process can now be seen immedi-
ately.
(i) Continual reallocation of workers. Consider a special case of the model in
which the state variable s is a constant. Then one can analyze steady states of
the model, which can be calculated in the following way. For any matrix of εijs,
one can compute a matrix of gross ßow rates from (3.5), and holding those ßow
rates constant one can compute steady-state values of the labor allocation vector
L from (3.7). All of this information can then be used to calculate the right hand
side of (3.13) for any i 6= j. Subtracting Cij, one can then compare the result with
εij. A Þxed point of this process is then a steady state. Since this computation
induces a continuous function, a steady state must exist. Label the steady state
value of the εij matrix so computed ε∗, the associated matrix of gross ßows m∗,
and the associated steady state labor allocation vector L∗.
The point is that even at this steady state, there will still be a constant
reallocation of workers. This is because the integrals in (3.5) will always have
positive values. The reason is that the workers experience idiosyncratic shocks
constantly, and each one will wish to change jobs or to move periodically for
personal reasons. Thus, the model has no trouble accommodating the empirical
fact that gross ßows are much larger than net ßows.
(ii) Gradual adjustment. Empirically, labor adjustment tends to occur gradu-
ally (for example, see evidence summarized by Rappaport (2000) on the intertem-
poral persistence of labor ßows across US locations). It is easy to see that this is
a feature of the present model as well. Indeed, if the economy is in a steady state
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and a shock occurs that changes the steady state allocation, the economy will not
reach the new economy in any Þnite time. To see this, consider once again the
special case in which s is a constant. Suppose that the economys steady state
allocation vector is L∗, with an associated steady state value ε∗ of the εij matrix
and associated matrix of gross ßows m∗. Denote the labor allocation matrix at
time t by Lt, and suppose that L0 6= L∗. Suppose that at time T , 0 < T < ∞,
the economy is in the steady state. Then at time t = T − 1, the right hand side
of (3.13) will take its steady state values, so the values of εij on the left hand side
must be equal to the corresponding elements of ε∗. But then (3.5), the matrix of
gross ßows mijT−1 at time T − 1 must equal the values in m∗. But then working
backward from the law of motion (3.6), we Þnd that LT−1 must be equal to L∗.10
Continuing in this logic, we Þnd that L0 = L∗, which is a contradiction.
Thus, the economy can move only gradually toward the steady state if it is
not already in it. The reason is again the idiosyncratic shocks. Suppose that a
given sector has enjoyed protection from imports for many years but suddenly
the protection is taken away, and the change is expected to be permanent. The
demand for labor in the sector drops, and the result is a reduction in the wages it
pays; workers begin to reallocate themselves to other sectors, but each period a
fraction of the workers waits because for those workers the cost of moving is high,
and it is in their interest to wait in hopes of a lower draw for their moving costs
in the near future.
(iii) Anticipatory movement of workers. In general, in this model if a change
in labor demand in some cell is foreseen, that will result in a movement of workers
before the fact. This can be seen most easily in a two-cell version of the model.
Suppose that cell 1 is an export sector and cell 2 is an import-competing sector,
which is protected by a tariﬀ. At time 0, the government announces that it will
eliminate the tariﬀ beginning in period T > 0. There are no other changes in
the economy at any time. This can be incorporated into the model by letting
st = t∀t, and by letting X2(·, s) have one functional form when s ≥ T and a
diﬀerent one when s < T . The function is shifted down and ßatter when s ≥ T
compared with when s < T , since the tariﬀ elevates the domestic price of cell
2s output, and hence the marginal value product of cell-2 labor. Let L∗, ε∗ and
m∗ denote the steady state values for the economy with the tariﬀ in place and
10Given L∗ and m∗, the equation (m∗)11L1T−1 + (m
∗)21(L − L1T−1) = (L∗)1 has a unique
solution for L1T−1 provided that (m
∗)11 6= (m∗)21. Given that m11 = Pr[ε1 > ε2 + ε12] =
Pr[ε1 > ε2 + β[eV2 − eV1]− C12] and m21 = Pr[ε1 + ε21 > ε2] = Pr[ε1 > ε2 + β[eV2 − eV1] + C21],
m11 > m21 provided that either C12 or C21 > 0.
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expected to remain permanently (call this the tariﬀ-aﬀected steady state), and
suppose that L0 = L∗. It can be seen quickly that no matter how large T is, the
adjustment begins immediately, in the sense that because of the announcement
the gross ßows even in period 0 are already diﬀerent from m∗.
To make the argument, it helps to consider two diﬀerent stationary models,
each with SS a singleton, so that we can drop s as an argument in the value
function. The Þrst model (the starred model) is one in which there is a tariﬀ
in place permanently, and the second model (the double-starred model) is one
in which there is never any tariﬀ. The values L∗, eε∗, and m∗, then, describe
the steady-state of the starred model. Denote the revenue functions for cell 2
for the two models by X2∗ and X2∗∗, respectively. Apart from these revenue
functions, the two models are identical. Denote the value functions by V ∗ and
V ∗∗ respectively. The following property is easy to verify.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that X2∗1 (L
2) > X2∗∗1 (L
2) for all L2 > 0. Then
dV ∗(L − L2, L2)/dL2 > dV ∗∗(L − L2, L2)/dL2 for all L2 ∈ (0, L] (call this the
strong derivative property).
Clearly, V (Lt, st) = V ∗∗(Lt) for t ≥ T . The Þrst-order condition at t = T − 1
is:
ε12T−1 + C
12 = β[dV ∗∗(L− eL2, eL2)/deL2],
where a tilde denotes a next-period value. Given that ε21t+1 = −ε12t+1−C12−C21 at
all times (see (3.9)), we can think of ε21t+1 as a decreasing function of ε
12
t+1. Thus,
an increase in ε12 will increase m12 and decrease m21, increasing the next-period
value of L2. By the concavity of V ∗∗, this will decrease the value of the right-hand
side of the Þrst-order condition. Thus, the right-hand side of the condition is a
downward-sloping curve in ε12, while the left hand side is an upward-sloping line
in ε12. As a result, for a given value of L2, anything that shifts the right-hand side
of the Þrst-order condition down will result in a lower value of ε12 . Therefore,
by Proposition (5.1), the solution to the Þrst-order condition at time T − 1 will
yield a lower value of ε12, and thus a higher value of ε21, along with a lower value
for the right-hand side of the Þrst-order condition, than would be chosen for the
same value of L2T−1 in the starred model. Using the envelope condition (3.10),
this implies that
dV (L− L2T−1, L2T−1; sT−1)/dL2T−1 < dV ∗2 (L− L2T−1, L2T−1)/dL2T−1
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for any L2T−1 ∈ (0, L]. Applying this same logic recursively back to t = 0, we
conclude that the value of ε120 (and hence the value of m
12
0 ) that is chosen is below
the value m∗12 that would have been chosen in the steady state of the starred
model. But that demonstrates the point: The response to the future announced
policy begins at the moment it is announced.
The interpretation of this result has to do once again with idiosyncratic shocks.
Even if wages are currently equal in the two sectors, if a worker knows that an
event will occur shortly in the future that will depress wages in sector 2 for a
long time afterward, and if that worker happens to have low moving costs at the
moment, understanding that her moving costs may not be so low later on, she
may simply jump at the opportunity to move now. For example, a worker who has
been separated from one Þrm in the sector that will experience the shock, instead
of looking for employment with another Þrm in the same sector, may simply move
to the other now that it is as easy to Þnd a job there as in the workers current
sector.
It should be noted that anticipatory movements of labor are also a feature
of Mussa-type models, as studied in detail by Dehejia (1997). However, in those
models, the anticipatory behavior is a result of the existence of a retraining sector
with rising marginal costs, while in the current model it arises purely from the
presence of time-varying idiosyncratic moving costs. Anticipatory reorientation of
an economy associated with a forthcoming change in trade policy is an important
phenomenon empirically, as documented for the case of accessions to trade blocs
by Freund and McLaren (1999). This mechanism provides an additional potential
source for it.
(iv) Anticipatory changes in wages. This is an immediate corollary to the
point just made. In the example discussed above, if workers begin to leave sector
2 immediately as soon as the planned future liberalization is announced, then
clearly wages in sector 2 will begin to rise right away and wages in sector 1 will
begin to fall right away. Of course, sector 2 wages will then drop abruptly at the
date of the actual liberalization, and continue to adjust after that.
This is important for a number of reasons. First, in doing empirical work
on the relationship between tariﬀs and wages, the issue of timing could be ex-
tremely important. Simply looking at a pair of snapshots taken before and after
a liberalization, for example, could miss a large part of the actual movement in
wages; further, in the simple story just told, if the pre-liberalization data were
collected very shortly before the liberalization, the empirical results would over-
state the downward eﬀect of the liberalization on wages in the aﬀected sector.
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Second, these anticipatory eﬀects on wages can provide a motive for gradualism
in trade policy. If the government wishes to compensate the workers harmed by
a liberalization but cannot do so through lump-sum transfers, announcing the
policy change in advance and allowing these adjustment mechanisms to do their
work can in principle be an eﬀective way of doing so. This is a point made by
Dehejia (1997) in the context of a Mussa-type model.
(v) Persistent wage diﬀerentials in long-run equilibrium. A feature of the
model that is not obvious is that it generally predicts wage diﬀerentials across
cells even in the steady state.
Consider, once again, a version with two cells and with s constant. Suppose
that C12 = C21, and suppose that there is a steady state in which w2 ≥ w1.
Observe that if in that steady state L1 > L2, then we must have m21 > m12.
From (3.5), this implies that ε21 > ε12. Recalling that Ω(εi) = Eε[maxj{εj+εij}]
, this implies that Ω(ε2) > Ω(ε1). From (4.3) applied recursively, that means that
υ2 > υ1. But from (4.1), this implies that ε21 < ε12, a contradiction. Thus, in
order to have L1 > L2 in the steady state, we must also have w1 > w2. Thus, in
the steady state a sector will have a higher wage than the other if and only if it has
more workers than the other. This conclusion contrasts sharply with the behavior
of a Mussa-type model, in which factor returns are equalized across sectors in the
long run (see Mussa (1978)).
The explanation is as follows. Suppose that both cells had the same wage in
the steady state, but cell 1 was ten times the size of cell 2. In that case, workers
would be indiﬀerent between the two cells apart from idiosyncratic eﬀects. In
each period, a certain fraction of the workers in either cell would realize negative
moving costs, which could be interpreted as boredom with the current job or
location or a desire to move to the other cell to realize some personal opportunity.
With the wages identical, an identical fraction of the workers in each cell would
wish to change sectors in each period. However, this would imply a much larger
number of workers moving from 1 to 2 than vice versa. The result would be
net migration toward 2, which would push down the wage in cell 2 and pull up
the wage in cell 1. The wage diﬀerential thus created would then tend to slow
down migration out of 1 and speed up migration out of 2, and this process would
continue until the aggregate number of workers moving in each direction would
be equal.
These eﬀects, which might be called frictional wage diﬀerentials, thus provide
a new reason for persistent intersectoral or geographic wage diﬀerences, quite in-
dependent of compensating diﬀerentials, eﬃciency wages and union eﬀects, which
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have been emphasized in the labor economics literature. It should also be empha-
sized that these eﬀects occur even if the average moving costs Cij are all equal
to zero. The persistent wage diﬀerentials are induced entirely by the variance in
idiosyncratic eﬀects.
(vi) Limiting behaviour as idiosyncratic shocks become important. Finally,
there is a sense in which the aggregate behaviour of the model when idiosyncratic
shocks are very important mimics the aggregate behaviour of a static model with
no mobility at all. This underlines how crucial it is to take account of gross
ßows, as is being done here, and to estimate the structural parameters of the
mobility costs, because using a reduced-form econometric approach could produce
normative conclusions that would be seriously in error.
To make this point, consider a class of distributions for the εis indexed by δ >
0 in the following way. For a particular distribution function G1 and associated
density g1, the distribution function Gδ and density gδ are deÞned by Gδ(ε) =
G1(ε/δ) and gδ(ε) = g1(ε/δ)/δ. Thus, Gδ is a radial mean-preserving spread
of G1 for δ > 1; the probability that ε ≤ y with the distribution G1 is equal
to the probability that ε ≤ δy with the distribution Gδ. With this family of
distributions, if δ is very small, then idiosyncratic eﬀects are trivial most of the
time, but as δ becomes large, idiosyncratic eﬀects become more important and
can eventually dwarf wages in their eﬀect on workers decisions. The asymptotic
eﬀects of increases in δ are summarized in the following.
Proposition 5.2. When the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is given by the
family Gδ, as δ → ∞ the matrix of gross ßows mij converges uniformly in equi-
librium over the whole state space to a matrix each of whose components is equal
to 1/n.
Thus, if δ is very large, regardless of the labor demand shocks, workers would
always be approximately evenly distributed across the cells of the economy. In
this extreme case, which is certainly not realistic but a useful thought experiment
to make a point, the number of workers in each cell would be completely insensitive
to, for example, the elimination of tariﬀs, and all of the adjustment would occur in
the form of changes in wages. Aggregate data would suggest that each industry
has in eﬀect a captive labor force, and the cost of the elimination of a tariﬀ on
textiles, for example, would be borne entirely by workers in the textile sector,
while all other workers would enjoy a net beneÞt through lower textile prices.
However, this would be quite wrong. In such an economy, far from being captive,
workers would be very footloose, and a typical textile worker would face only a 1/n
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chance of continuing in the textile sector next period. Therefore, particularly if n
is large, the cost borne by the textile workers would be very low; for most of such a
workers future career, she would be in other sectors, enjoying the beneÞt of lower
prices. It may in fact be a Pareto-improving liberalization, while the reduced-
form approach would mistakenly conclude that one sector of workers would be
badly hurt and would bitterly oppose the liberalization. Thus, a focus on gross
ßows in equilibrium, and attention to the variance of mobility costs as well as
their means, are, in principle, crucial to getting the normative conclusions right.
6. A special case, and empirical implementation.
The model takes a particularly tractable form when a judicious choice of func-
tional form is made. Assume that the εit are generated from an extreme-value
distribution with parameters (−γν, ν), which implies:11





Note that while we make the natural assumption that the εs be mean-zero, we do
not impose any restrictions on the variance, leaving ν (which is positively related
to the variance) as a free parameter to be estimated.
It can easily be shown that, with this assumption:
εijt ≡ βEt[V jt+1 − V it+1]− Cij = ν[lnmijt − lnmiit ] (6.1)
and:
Ω(εit) = −ν lnmiit . (6.2)
11The cumulative distribution, mean, and variance for an extreme-value distribution with
parameters (α, ν) are given by:








For further properties of the extreme-value distribution, see Patel, Kapadia, and Owen (1976).
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Both these expressions make intuitive sense. The Þrst says that the greater the
expected net (of moving costs) beneÞts of moving to j, the larger should be the
observed ratio of movers (from i to j) to stayers. Moreover, holding constant the
(average) expected net beneÞts of moving, a higher variance of the idiosyncratic
cost shocks lowers the compensating migratory ßow if the average net beneÞt is
positive and raises it if they are negative.
The second expression says that the greater the probability of remaining in
cell i, the lower the value of having the option to move from cell i.12 Moreover,
as one might expect, when the variance of the idiosyncratic component of moving
costs increases, so too does the value of having the option to move.
Substituting from (6.1) and (6.2) into (3.13) we get:
Cij + ν[lnmijt − lnmiit ] = βEt[wjt+1 − wit+1 + Cij + ν[lnmijt+1 − lnmiit+1]
+ν[lnmiit+1 − lnmjjt+1]]






(wjt+1 − wit+1) + β(lnmijt+1 − lnmjjt+1)−
(1− β)
ν




This has the virtue that it can be estimated with data on gross ßows and
wages, using standard Generalized Method of Moment techniques. This is an
ongoing project.
7. Conclusion.
This paper has articulated an equilibrium model of labor adjustment to external
shocks, which has been designed to be useful for trade policy analysis and to be
empirically estimable. The key features are an inÞnite horizon in which all workers
have rational expectations; the possibility of shocks to labor demand in a sector
(as caused, for example, by a change in trade policy) or in a geographic location;
publicly observable costs of moving or of changing sectors; and time-varying, id-
iosyncratic private costs as well. We have shown that the equilibrium solves a
particular social planners dynamic programming problem, which facilitates anal-
ysis of the equilibrium. In addition, the equilibrium exhibits gross ßows in excess
12Note that 0 < miit < 1, so Ω(ε
i
t) = −ν lnmiit > 0.
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of net ßows (and indeed, constant movement of workers even in a steady state),
which is an important feature of empirical labor adjustment; gradual adjustment
to a shock; anticipatory adjustment to an announced policy change; and persis-
tent frictional wage diﬀerentials across geographic locations or sectors, which
will exist even if the average moving costs are zero, and which provide a new and
independent theoretical rationale for wage diﬀerentials in long-run equilibrium.
We have also shown, through a simple thought experiment, why the idiosyncratic
shocks we highlight and the variance of those shocks are potentially so important
to the normative conclusions in applied work.
Finally, it is shown that the key equilibrium condition takes a particularly
simple form when the functional forms are chosen in a particular way, making
the econometric estimation of the parameters of the model feasible with data on
gross ßows and wages over time for a particular economy. This is the subject of
ongoing work.
8. Appendix.
Proof of Proposition (3.1). Clearly χ(eε) is decreasing and continuous, with
χ(eε) → 0 as eε → ∞ and χ(eε) → mijt as eε → −∞. Clearly ξ(eε) is increasing and
continuous, with ξ(eε)→ miit as eε→∞ and χ(eε)→ 0 as eε→ −∞. Thus, we can
Þnd an ε∗ such that χ(ε∗) = ξ(ε∗). If χ(ε∗) = 0, we are done. If not, then we
have a positive mass of i workers who have εi− εj < ε∗ and who remain in i, and
an equal mass of i workers who have εi − εj > ε∗ and who move to j. Clearly, if
we simply reversed their roles, making the movers stay and the stayers move, the
next-period allocation of labor would be unchanged, and the total surplus would
be higher. Therefore, the original allocation rule could not have been optimal.
Proof of Proposition (3.2). Consider an optimal allocation. Suppose that
for some i, j, k, Lt, st, and some set A(1) ⊆ <n with positive probability measure,
εj + εij > εk + εik and yet Dik(ε;Lt, st) > 0∀ε ∈ A(1). Without loss of generality,
assume that for all ε ∈ A(1), εj + εij − (εk + εik) ≥ eε > 0. For any positive N ,
consider the ball of radius 1/N around the point ε = (−εi1,−εi2, . . . ,−εin), and
note that within such a ball will be points for which the expression εi − εi0 − εii0
is negative for all i0, points for which it is positive for all i0, and points with every




= 0∀i0) . For N = 1, . . . ,∞, deÞne a subset of such a ball, B(N) ⊆ <n, by











= 0∀i0.) By the previous proposition, Dij =
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workers in A(N) who go to k is equal to the smaller of p(1) and the measure
of B(N). For large enough N , we will have εj + εij − (εk + εik) < eε for all
ε ∈ B(N), and a measure of workers in A(N) going to k that is equal to the
measure of workers in B(N) who go to j. But then for every worker in A(N),
εj−εk ≥ εik−εij+eε, and the worker moves to k; while for every worker in B(N),
εj − εk < εik − εij + eε, and the worker moves to j. Clearly, if for ε ∈ A(N),
we simply reduced Dik(ε;Lt, st) to 0 and increased Dij(ε;Lt, st) by Dik(ε;Lt, st);
and if for ε ∈ B(N), we reduced Dij(ε;Lt, st) to 0 and increased Dik(ε;Lt, st)
to 1; then the total number of workers going to each cell would be unchanged.
However, a positive mass of workers in A(N) and in B(N) will have reversed their
roles; B(N) workers with lower values of εj − εk now move to k and the A(N)
workers with higher values of εj− εk move to j. Thus, the next-period allocation
of labor would be unchanged, and the total surplus would be higher. Therefore,
the original allocation rule could not have been optimal.
Proof of Proposition (3.3). Recall the gross ßow function deÞned by (3.5).
It is convenient to deÞne a truncated version of this function. First, let x−k denote
the vector made by deleting the kth element of x (if x has fewer than k elements,
x−k = x). After deleting one or more elements of a vector, continue to index the
remaining elements in the same way, so, for example, if x ∈ <n and n > i, then
(x−i)n = xn. In addition, for any vector x, let x[k] denote the vector made up of
its Þrst k elements; let x−[k] denote the vector made up of all of its elements after
the kth.
Then, for any i, deÞne emi : <n−1 → {x ∈ (0, 1)n−1 : Pj xj < 1}, withemi(εi−i) = (mi(εi))−i. Thus, emi deÞnes the gross ßows out of i, but not the
residual category of i workers who stay in i, and it deÞnes them as a function of
εi−i.







f(εj)f(εj + εij − εii0)
Y
k 6=j,i0
F (εj + εij − εik)dεj < 0
24

















0 − εil)dεi0 > 0 (8.1)
if i0 = j.














F (εi − εik)dεi
> 0.
Thus, the matrix of derivatives






which is the Jacobian of the emi function, is a dominant diagonal matrix with pos-
itive elements on the main diagonal and negative elements oﬀ the main diagonal.
This implies that it has an inverse (see Theorem 1 in McKenzie (1960)), and that
the inverse has only positive elements (see Theorem 4 in McKenzie (1960)). This
information is useful in the remainder of the proof.
Now, Þx i. The proof will proceed by induction. DeÞne the induction hypoth-
esis P (n0) for n0 ≤ n as follows.
DeÞnition 8.1. P (n0): For any εi ∈ <n and for anym∗ ∈ (0, 1)n withPj(m∗)j =
1, there exists a unique bε ∈ <n0 such that (emi(bε, (εi−i)−[n0])[n0] = (m∗−i)[n0].
In other words, P (n0) says that for any value of the εijs from j = n0 + 1 to n
and for any set of desired gross ßows m∗ from j = 1 to n0, we can Þnd exactly one
choice of εijs from j = 1 to n0 (denoted ε) that will provide exactly those desired
gross ßows. Where P (n0) holds, it will be useful to write the bε as a function:bε((εi−i)−[n0]; (m∗−i)[n0]).
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Of course, the statement to be proved is simply P (n). It is clear that P (1)
holds, since by (3.5) mi1 is continuous and strictly increasing in εi1, mi1 → 0 as
εi1 → −∞ and mi1 → 1 as εi1 → ∞. Thus, the only task remaining is to show
that P (n0) implies P (n0 + 1).
Suppose that P (n0) holds, and so the bε function deÞned above exists. Fix
(ε∗−i)
−[n0] and (m∗−i)
[n0]. Consider the Þrst n0 elements of the mi function as a
function of (εi)[n
0], holding (εi)−[n
0] constant. By (8.1), the derivatives of this
function form an n0-square dominant diagonal matrix with positive elements on
the main diagonal and negative elements oﬀ it. This implies that the inverse of
that matrix exists and that it has all positive elements (see Theorems 1 and 4
in McKenzie (1960), respectively). This inverse is, then, the Jacobian of the bε





0+1) ≡ (emi)(bε(ε¯i,n0+1, (ε∗−i)−[n0+1]; (m∗−i)[n0]), ε¯i,n0+1, (ε∗−i)−[n0+1]),
the ßow vector resulting from a given choice for εi,n
0+1, given that εi,k have been
Þxed for k > n0 + 1 and that εi,k for k ≤ n0 are adjusted to keep the Þrst n0
elements of the ßow vector equal to (m∗−i)
[n0]. The µ function is diﬀerentiable by





















The left hand side of this equation is an n0 + 1-square matrix of derivatives
multiplied by an (n0 + 1)-by-1 vector. The right hand side is an (n0 + 1)-by-1
vector that has n0 zeroes, due to the deÞnition of the ε function. Once again, by
the properties of dominant diagonal matrices, the inverse of the Þrst matrix on
the left hand side exists and has only positive elements. Therefore, every element
of the vector on the left-hand side has the same sign as dµn
0+1/dεi,n
0+1. Since
1 > 0, this means that dµn
0+1/dεi,n
0+1 > 0. Further, dε/dεi,n
0+1 is positive in
each element.
From (3.5), we can see that µn
0+1 → 0 as ε¯i,n0+1 → −∞. (For example,
as ε¯i,n
0+1 → −∞, F (εn0+1 + εi,n0+1 − εi,n) → 0 pointwise, so by the dominated
convergence theorem mi,n
0+1 → 0.) Further, µk → 0 as ε¯i,n0+1 → ∞ for k >
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n0 + 1 (by a parallel argument), so µn
0+1 →
³
1−Pn0j=1(m∗−i)j´ as ε¯i,n0+1 → ∞.












0+1 > 0, as noted above, this value of ε¯i,n
0+1 is unique.
Thus, P (n0 + 1) holds.
Proof of Proposition (3.4). Claim (i) is straightforward, since the planner
could always set Dii ≡ 1 for all i, which would ensure a non-negative value for
(3.2) since Cii ≡ 0. Claim (ii) follows from the continuity of the value function
(trivially implied by its diﬀerentiability).
The proof of claim (iii) is as follows. Return to the original form of the problem,
(3.2). Fix L∗ > L, and deÞne SL(L∗) ≡ {L ∈ <n|Li ≥ 0;Pi Li ∈ [0, L∗]}. If
L∗∗ > L∗, it is easy to see that for states in SL(L∗)× SS, the value function that
solves the Bellman equation with the state space limited to SL(L∗)×SS will agree
with the function that solves it with the state space SL(L∗∗) × SS. Thus, if we
show that the Bellman equation derived for any Þnite L∗ is concave in L, we are
done. That will now be demonstrated.















This is the second term in the objective function. In addition, deÞne the Bellman
operator T on the space of bounded real functions on SL(L∗)× Ss by:





X i(L, s) +B(L,D) + βEes[W (eL, es)|s]},
where eL is determined from L and D by (3.6). A Þxed point of T will be a
solution to the Bellman equation, and by the usual logic of discounted dynamic
programming, T is a contraction mapping, so that there is a unique Þxed point,
and it can be found as the limit of T k(W ) as k → 0 for any bounded function W .
Now consider a bounded and concave function W , and consider two diﬀerent
points in the state space, a = (La, s) and b = (Lb, s). In the optimization required
in the deÞnition of T (W ), denote the allocation rule chosen at state a by Da, and
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the induced next-period labor allocation by eLa, and similarly use Db and eLb for
state b. Now, consider the point c = αLa + (1 − α)Lb, for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Construct the allocation rule:




a (ε) + (1− α)LibDijb (ε)]/Lc.
Since Dc is a weighted average of Da and Db within each cell, it satisÞes (3.1) and





























= αB(La, Da) + (1− α)B(Lb,Db).
Further, the next-period labor allocation vector that it induces is equal to
αeLa + (1− α)eLb. We now have:
T (W )(Lc, s) ≥
nX
i=1




X i(Lc, s) + αB(La,Da) + (1− α)B(Lb, Db) + βEes[W (eLc, es)|s]}
> αT (W )(La, s) + (1− α)T (W )(Lb, s).
The Þrst inequality follows from optimization, and the fact that Dc is feasible.
The last inequality follows from the concavity of X i and W , and from the fact
that Da is optimal at point a and Db is optimal at point b.
Therefore, if W is bounded and concave, so will be T k(W ) for any k, and so
must be the limit function, which is the true value function V . This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition (3.5). Note that the derivative of U with respect to
28








(εj − Cij)f(εj)f(εj + εij − εii0)
Y
k 6=j,i0

















0 − εil)dεi0 .




















(The equality follows, Þrst, because the term in parentheses equals zero when
j = i0, so we can lift the restriction that j 6= i0 without aﬀecting the equation; and
second, the sum of derivatives of the ßows across all cells resulting from a change
in εii
0













DeÞne the function εi as the inverse of the function emi deÞned in the beginning









































takes a value of 1 if j equals 1, −1 if j equals i, and zero otherwise. Thus, the
Þrst order condition reduces to:
L1
Ã
−εi1 − Ci1 + βE ∂
eV
∂eL1 + εii + Cii − βE ∂ eV∂eLi
!
= 0, or






This equation says that the marginal cost of moving a worker from i to 1 is
equal at the optimum to the expected discounted marginal beneÞt of doing so.
This can be repeated for any pair of cells i and j with i 6= j, to yield the indicated
condition.
Proof of Proposition (3.6). Using (3.8) and (3.4), we have:
∂V (L, s)
∂Li


























































This is the indicated condition.
Proof of Proposition (5.1). Suppose that W ∗ and W ∗∗ are two bounded,
concave value functions with dW ∗(L − L2, L2)/dL2 ≥ dW ∗∗(L − L2, L2)/dL2 for
all L2 ∈ (0, L] (call this the weak derivative property), and let T be the operator
on value functions deÞned by the planners Bellman equation. Then we claim
that T (W ∗) and T (W ∗∗) are both bounded and continuous with dT (W ∗)(L −
L2, L2)/dL2 ≥ dT (W ∗∗)(L− L2, L2)/dL2 for all L2 ∈ (0, L] .
The boundedness of T (W ∗) and T (W ∗∗) is immediate, and their concavity
can be proven with the same argument as was used in the proof of Proposition
(3.4). For the derivative property, note that the Þrst-order condition for solving
the Bellman equation with the function W ∗∗ is:
ε12 + C12 = β[dW ∗∗(L− eL2, eL2)/deL2],
where a tilde indicates next-period variables computed from the gross ßow matrix.
Given that ε21t+1 = −ε12t+1−C12−C21 at all times (see (3.9)), we can think of ε21t+1
as a decreasing function of ε12t+1. Thus, an increase in ε
12 will increase m12 and
decrease m21, increasing the next-period value of L2. By the concavity of W ∗∗,
this will decrease the value of the right-hand side of the Þrst-order condition.
Thus, the right-hand side of the condition is a downward-sloping curve in ε12. At
the same time, the left hand side of the condition is an upward-sloping line in ε12.
As a result, for a given value of L2, anything that shifts the right-hand side of
the Þrst-order condition down will result in a lower value of ε12 . Therefore, for
a given value of L2, the solution to the Þrst-order condition with W ∗∗ will yield
a lower value of ε12, and thus a higher value of ε21, along with a lower value for
the right-hand side of the Þrst-order condition, than will the solution with W ∗.
But then applying the envelope condition (3.10) to T (W ∗) and T (W ∗∗), it is clear
that the weak derivative property holds for T (W ∗) and T (W ∗∗). This proves the
claim.
Therefore, from any initial bounded and concave W ∗ and W ∗∗ satisfying the
weak derivative property, T k(W ∗) and T k(W ∗∗) will also be bounded and concave
and satisfy the derivative property for any k, and so the property holds in the
limit as k → ∞. Thus, the value functions V ∗ and V ∗∗ also satisfy the weak
derivative property.
From here there is one step required to show that the value functions satisfy
the strong derivative property. Considering the Þrst-order conditions again, this
time for V ∗ and V ∗∗ respectively, the curve-shifting logic used in the proof of the
claim above shows that for a given value of L2, the value of ε12 chosen with V ∗
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will be at least as great as that chosen with V ∗∗. Therefore, again looking at the
envelope condition (3.10) and noting that X2∗1 (L
2) > X2∗∗1 (L
2) for all L2 > 0, the
strong derivative condition is immediate.



















where mijδ denotes the gross ßow from i to j as calculated from (3.5) using the











Gδ(δ(eεij − eεik) + εj)gδ(εj)dεj −X
i,j
Limijδ (δeε)Cij,
where eε is an n-square matrix of real numbers with eεii = 0. In other words, eε is
simply ε, scaled down by a factor of δ.
Since
mijδ (δeε) = Z Y
k 6=j
















G1(eεij −eεik + ε)g1(ε)dε
= mij1 (eε),







































G1(eεij − eεik + ε)g1(ε)dε.
Each of these Ai functions takes a unique maximum at eεi = 0. To see this,
consider a sample of n independent draws from the distribution G1, and call the
realized values ε1, . . . εn. The function Ai(eεi) is the expectation of the j∗th of
these, where j∗ is the value of j that maximizes {eεij + εj}. On the other hand,
Ai(0) is simply the expectation of the highest of the εjs. Thus, Ai(0) must be
higher.
We can now rewrite the objective function once again:
Uδ(L, s,eε)/δ =X
i
LiAi(eεi) + [X(L, s)−X
i,j
Limij1 (eε)Cij ]/δ. (8.2)
The maximization of (3.3) is, of course, equivalent to maximizing the expected
present discounted value of Uδ(L, s,eε)/δ. Further, we can speak in terms of the
optimal choice of eε in each state instead of the optimal choice of ε without making
any substantive diﬀerence.
Fix∆ > 0. Let b∆ =Pi LiAi(0)−sup|eε|≥∆Pi LiAi(eε) > 0, where |eε| indicates
the absolute value of the element of eε that is farthest from zero. (Think of b∆
as the minimum loss from having eε a distance ∆ away from its optimum of 0.)
The point will be to demonstrate that if δ is large enough, we will have |eε| < ∆,
regardless of the value of L and s.
From (2.1) and the fact that
P
iL
i ≡ L, the last two terms of (8.2) can be
made uniformly arbitrarily small by choosing δ suﬃciently high. Choose δ high
enough that those two terms are always less than (1 − β)b∆/2 in absolute value.
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Now, suppose that the optimal rule for choosing eε has at some state (L∗, s∗) a
value of eε with |eε| > ∆. Now, replace that rule with one that is identical except
that at that state, and at all other states after that state has once been reached,eε is set equal to 0. In the Þrst period in which the change takes eﬀect, that
would increase the value of the Þrst term of (8.2) by at least b∆. Thereafter, it
could not reduce the value of that term, because with eε = 0, that term would
be at its maximum. On the other hand, in the Þrst period of the change or
in any subsequent period, the second two terms together could fall by at most
(1 − β)b∆/2, so the expected present discounted value of the reduction in those
terms would be at most [(1 − β)b∆/2]/(1 − β) = b∆/2. Thus, the change in the
value of the objective function due to the change in rule evaluated at the state
(L∗, s∗) would be at least equal to b∆ − b∆/2 = b∆/2 > 0. This contradicts the
assumption that the initial rule was optimal.
Thus, we have that eε as a function of L and s converges uniformly to the














we conclude that mij1 (eε(L, s)) converges to the constant 1/n uniformly as δ →
∞.
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